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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 











Supreme Court Docket Number 40477-2012 
Bear Lake County Docket Number 1997-228 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bear Lake County 
The Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
Criss James 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 474-31 West Center 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
Attorney for Appellant 
Teddy Lynn Edghill 
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Lawrence G. Wasden 
Office of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Attorney for Respondent 
The State ofldaho 
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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On September 17, 1997, the Appellant, Teddy Lynn Edghill, was driving a jeep on private 
property with a valid driver's license. Several children were riding on the front bumper of the 
vehicle. At some point, one of the children who was riding on the front bumper either jumped or 
fell off the front bumper and was run over by the jeep. The minor child died a short time later from 
the injuries sustained in the accident. Edghill was charged with vehicular manslaughter. LC.§ 
18-4006(3)(a). Edghill pled guilty and was sentenced to a unified six-year term of incarceration, 
with three years fixed. The District Court also suspended Edghill's driver's license for life, 
however the District Court also ruled that Edghill could come back to the Court after ten years and 
request to have his driving privileges reinstated. The District Court also retained jurisdiction in this 
matter. At the expiration of the retained jurisdiction period, the District Court suspended 
execution of Edghill' s sentence and placed him on probation for a period of four years. After the 
expiration of the ten years, Edghill requested the Court to reinstate his driving privileges. Judge 
Don L. Harding granted Edghill restricted driving privileges on three separate occasions for 
various lengths of time. After the third period of restricted driving privileges granted by Judge 
Harding had expired, Edghill filed a motion to reinstate his driving privileges. Judge Mitchell W. 
Brown denied this motion and removed the portion of Edghill' s sentence which allowed him to 
have his driving privileges reinstated after ten years, claiming the Court had no jurisdiction to 
grant Edghill driving privileges and that the sentence imposed by Judge Harding was illegal. Thus, 
Judge Brown sentenced Edghill to a lifetime ban of driving privileges without any possibility of 
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having his driving privileges reinstated. Edghill then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting the Court 
to correct the illegal sentence and reinstate Edghill's driving privileges. The District Court denied 
Edghill any relief on his Rule 35 motion. 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE STATE 
1. Has Edghill failed to show the district court's order should be reversed where the court 
correctly applied the facts and law pursuant to Edghill's motion, but the result was unfavorable to 
Edghill? 
2. Is Edghill precluded from rearguing that his original sentence was illegal? 
The appellant rephrases the State's issues as: 
1. Can the State present any case law to show that the District Court correctly applied the 
facts to Edghill's motion? 
2. Is Edghill precluded from appealing the sentence imposed by Judge Brown? 
ARGUMENT 




The State would like to argue that the law in Idaho is that a Rule 35 Motion is strictly 
limited to the correction of the illegal portion of an illegal sentence. The State then infers from 
the claim that if the District Court is strictly limited to the correction of the illegal portion of a 
sentence, then the District Court in this case can only strike the portion of the sentence that allowed 
Edghill the ability to have his driving privileges reinstated after ten years. 
1. Standard of Review 
The District Court states in the Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Rule 35 
Motion dated October 2, 2012, "While this Court could not find any Idaho case law directly on 
point, the Ninth circuit has clearly held in US. v. Jordan, 895 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989), that "Rule 
35 is strictly limited to the correction of the illegal portion of an illegal sentence." Marcel Jordan 
was a Defendant in Federal Court convicted on nineteen counts of mail fraud. The sentencing 
Judge imposed twelve years of incarceration on every count and ordered that all of the nineteen 
counts be served concurrently. The maximum sentence for mail fraud was five years and so 
Jordan filed a Rule 35 motion to correct the illegal sentence. The District Court then resentenced 
Jordan to a term of two years of incarceration on six of the counts and ordered the six counts to run 
consecutively. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for resentencing and 
ordered that the new sentences be restructured as concurrent terms of no more than five years each. 
The Ninth Circuit stated the District Court could not amend the sentence to have the counts run 
consecutively. Such precedence provides little if any direction in the present case. First, the 
ruling was not based on Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The fact that Jordan had his term of 
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incarceration reduced from twelve years to five years is also of little assistance to the Court in this 
case. 
The case law in Jordan only dealt with the issue of what the sentencing court should do 
when the original term of incarceration is in excess of the legal maximum. There was no 
discussion as to how a sentencing court can correct an illegal sentence dealing with the issue of 
driving privileges or anything similar to such a condition. This is a case of first impression in the 
State ofldaho and a clear rule should be set to give meaningful guidance to a District Court when 
resentencing a Defendant who received an illegal sentence. The government in Jordan requested 
the Court to enter a clear rule and cited the case of United States v. Lopez, 706 F.2d 108, 109-10 
(2d Cir. 1983). If there was a clear rule that a District Court could correct an illegal sentence so 
long as the Court does not make the length of incarceration or the other conditions placed on the 
Defendant harsher than the original sentence, the District Court in the above entitled case could 
have properly corrected Edghill' s sentence. When the District Court corrected the illegal sentence 
in this case, the Court should have considered the facts of this case and what had transpired since 
the original sentence was imposed on May 21, 1998. Often a sentencing court wishes that they 
could have a crystal ball to see into the future before imposing a sentence. In this case the Distract 
Court was afforded fourteen years into the future to review before the Court imposed an 
appropriate resentence and did not do so. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Can the Defendant appeal the sentence of Judge Brown? 
Introduction 
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The State would like this Court to deny Edghill any relief because he is appealing the 
sentence of Judge Harding. Edghill is not appealing the sentence of Judge Harding, but rather the 
sentence of Judge Brown. There is no doubt that the sentence give by Judge Harding and the 
sentence imposed by Judge Brown are not the same. Judge Harding's sentence allows Edghill the 
possibility to have his driving privileges reinstated after a ten year suspension of his driving 
privileges. Judge Brown's sentence suspends the driving privileges of Edghill for the duration of 
his life. 
2. Standard of Review 
While the Jordan case provided little if any direction for the Court in the present case, the 
Court in Jordan and the cases discussed in Jordan all refer to the sentence a defendant receives 
after it has been determined that the original sentence the defendant received was an illegal 
sentence as a "new sentence." These Courts also on multiple occasions referred to the sentence 
that a defendant receives after his original sentence has been declared illegal as a "resentencing." 
Because of the major difference in the sentences Edghill received from Judge Harding and Judge 
Brown concerning the length of the suspension of the driving privileges and the fact that the 
sentence received from Judge Brown was a "new sentence" or a ''resentencing," Edghill is 
appealing the sentence of Judge Brown and not the original sentence imposed by Judge Harding. 
Therefore the principle of untimeliness, and the doctrine of waiver and the doctrine of res judicata 
do not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no objective information set forth in Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision and 
Order explaining why Edghill should receive a harsher sentence on resentencing other than Judge 
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Brown believed the Court did not have ongoing jurisdiction to oversee Edghill's driving 
privileges. The harsher sentence imposed on Edghill was not deserved and is an abuse of 
discretion. Edghill successfully completed the Retained Jurisdiction Program and successfully 
completed his probation. Edghill did not have any further violations of the law except for a 
charge of an invalid license in 2005. TR. February 16, 2012 Hearing, P. 31 L. 8-14. Edghill has 
become a productive member of society. Edghill has a consistent work history and had been 
employed for the same construction company for the past five years TR. February 16, 2012 
Hearing P.10 L.22-25. Edghill is a member of the local volunteer fire department TR. February 
16, 2012 Hearing P.15 L.7-9. Edghill had made the type of progress in his life that should have 
allowed him to have his driving privileges reinstated. 
The lifetime suspension ofEdghill's driving privileges is unduly harsh. Edghill was 
twenty-nine years old when the accident occurred which resulted in him being charged with 
vehicular manslaughter. At that time he had been legally driving for 12 or 13 years and his only 
driving offense up until that point was a speeding ticket. TR. February 16, 2012 Hearing PlO. L. 
1-14. Teddy Edghill respectfully request this matter be remanded to the District Court for a 
resentencing with an instruction that the District Court can correct this sentence as long as the 
terms and conditions of the new sentence are not harsher that the original sentence. 
+~ 
DATED this ;},J_ day of May, 2013. 
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S.CrissJames ;7 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of May, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method indicated: 
ATTORNEY(S)/PERSON(S) 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Office of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
DATED this ~'('/.. day of May, 2013 
10 
METHOD 
US Mail 
